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BEYOND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: 21ST CENTURY
CHOICES FOR EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Economic cooperation, including in East Asia, involves more than trade liberalisation.
Other opportunities for cooperation include the exchange of expertise and technology
enhancing communications networks as well as cooperative arrangements to facilitate
trade and investment.
Many formal border barriers to trade have already been reduced to negligible levels. At
the same time, political pressures continue to sustain high protection of a few sensitive
sectors, especially in agriculture. In such circumstances, there is little need for formal
agreements to liberalise trade in most products, while seeking such agreements to
liberalise trade in sensitive sectors is likely to prove either impossible or divisive. It would
seem more efficient to leave attempts to deal with sensitive sectors to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), while pursuing cooperation among East Asian economies on other
matters. Nevertheless, East Asian governments are preferring to follow the conven-
tional wisdom that serious economic cooperation must start with a preferential trade
arrangement (PTA).
If these agreements merely meet the minimum requirements of the WTO, they will avoid
the hard issues and it will not prove possible to link them to an East Asia-wide trading
arrangement. They could make it harder to pursue other mutually beneficial opportu-
nities for region-wide cooperation.
Alternatively, East Asian leaders could adopt WTO-plus principles for their PTAs, along
the lines recommended in this paper. These guidelines would require them to cover all
products and to extend such liberalisation to other economies in the medium term. Such
WTO-plus PTAs could be linked subsequently and could form part of broader efforts
towards economic cooperation and integration.
This paper spells out the multiple objectives of closer economic partnerships. These can
be achieved only by careful assignment of alternative options for cooperation, ranging
from bilateral to multilateral and from voluntary to formally binding arrangements.
PTAs are one of these options; however, they can only be an efficient component of
efforts to forge East Asia-wide cooperation if they are based on WTO-plus principles.
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The setting
The financial crises of the late 1990s sparked off a strong political drive towards East Asian
economic cooperation.1  This has already led to the ASEAN+3 process to link Northeast and
Southeast Asian economies. China and Japan have both initiated separate options for
cooperation with ASEAN economies.
Many other options have also been mooted, including an ASEAN Common Market to
follow up the completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), with cooperation on non-border
issues, such as trade and investment facilitation. Options for cooperation among China, South
Korea and Japan are being explored, as well as a potential East Asian Economic Community,
which would draw together both Northeast and Southeast Asian economies. Such a community
could take its place along the European Union (EU) and a potential Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA).
Motives for cooperation
The motive for these closer partnerships is political as much as economic. However, in the
foreseeable future, there is no intent to cede sovereignty to any sub-regional or regional supra-
national authority. Therefore, economic cooperation provides the practical means of forging new
links in East Asia.
As in the case of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the ultimate aim
of economic cooperation is to help participating economies to realise their full potential for
sustainable growth. Encouraging economic integration is a crucial part of this effort. Reducing
the costs and risks of international commerce, through reducing border barriers (liberalisation)
or making other economic policies more compatible (facilitation), is, in turn, an important means
of promoting economic integration.2
In recent decades, the most powerful force for economic integration in East Asia (and of
East Asia with the rest of the world) has been the willingness of most of its economies to open
themselves to the outside world, encouraging international competition in domestic markets
and increasing openness to new ideas. In the context of a generally non-discriminatory global
trading system, this has allowed greater specialisation in line with evolving comparative
advantage, leading to remarkable improvements in East Asian living standards. The emergence
of China as a major trading economy has done more to integrate East Asian economies than all
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the moves towards inter-governmental cooperation to reduce formal border barriers to trade and
investment.
Despite rapid economic growth, levels of development still vary widely and there is a
region-wide desire to narrow these differences. Moves towards East Asian economic cooperation
are, therefore, seen as more than trading arrangements. East Asians are looking for ways to
promote each others’ economic prospects, paying attention to sharing information, experience,
expertise and technology to boost capacity for development, creating more links between the
region’s transport, communications and energy infrastructure and efforts to reduce policy
impediments to economic integration.
The APEC process has struggled to strike an appropriate balance between efforts to reduce
trade barriers and other means to boost the capacity of Asia Pacific economies to take full
advantage of opportunities for growth which are being created by changing technology as well
as by movement towards free and open trade and investment.3
East Asian economies have sought to place more emphasis on capacity building in APEC
than on liberalising or facilitating trade and investment, so it could have been expected that they
would seek a corresponding emphasis within East Asian economic cooperation. So far, this does
not seem to be the case. Initial efforts towards economic cooperation are being dominated by free
trade areas (FTAs), which aim to reduce traditional border barriers to trade in goods and services
on a discriminatory basis.
Some East Asia-wide arrangements are emerging, for example the beginnings of financial
integration (de Brouwer 2002). However, efforts towards integration are being pursued mainly
by means of closer economic partnerships (CEPs), based on preferential trading arrangements
(PTAs). Some of these partnerships are sub-regional, but most of them are bilateral. It is hoped
that they will evolve into broader East Asian economic cooperation which, in its turn, would be
a building block towards Asia Pacific, and ultimately global, free trade and investment.4
Such a benign evolution, with each new partnership acting as a stepping stone towards
wider objectives, cannot be taken for granted. It is far from clear that bilateral and broader trade
policy objectives are being promoted in a coherent way, using all the policy options available,
ranging from unilateral to multilateral action, in order to tackle a diverse range of impediments
to economic integration.5
Regional cooperation is no substitute for global efforts. Whatever is achieved in terms of
economic integration within the region, East Asian economies will continue to need confident
trading links with the rest of the world. Therefore, East Asian economies have a vital interest
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in the successful conclusion of ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. If East
Asian economies make strategic use of the Doha Round, those negotiations can be used to reduce
border barriers to trade, not only within the region, but globally. That would allow intra-regional
cooperation in East Asia to concentrate on other aspects of cooperation.
While East Asian economies are considering partnerships with each other, other econo-
mies are also active. This is leading to the emergence of a ‘hub-and-spokes’ pattern around the
United States and the EU. The EU has developed an extensive network of PTAs which reach into
the Americas and may soon extend to parts of East Asia.6  The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) already links the United States to Canada and Mexico, with negotiations
under way for a possible FTAA which is expected to include most Latin American economies.
The United States has signed a new economic partnership with Singapore, has offered to begin
negotiations with other individual members of ASEAN and is negotiating a PTA with Australia.
Southeast and Northeast Asian economies are also looking for preferential deals with
these two ‘hubs’ as well as with other economies. Japan and Korea are seeking indirect links with
the US hub by negotiating FTAs with Chile and/or Mexico. Singapore has already signed PTAs
with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and is seeking to form a new one with India.
It is possible that all these initiatives will contribute to some kind of economic community in
East Asia, but much will depend on the design of these many overlapping discriminatory
agreements.7
East Asian economies are taking care to ensure that their new agreements are consistent
with the relevant provisions of the WTO. However, they are also tending to take advantage of
the ambiguities in existing WTO disciplines on PTAs. These loopholes allow them to avoid
liberalising the same sensitive products which they are reluctant to liberalise elsewhere,
whether unilaterally, in APEC or in WTO negotiations.
This tendency to avoid difficult issues limits the choice of partners. For example, Japan
can only deal with economies which have very little agricultural land or are willing to exempt
much of agriculture. If PTAs are tailor-made to exempt the most sensitive sectors of current
participants, then it will be difficult to include other economies with different characteristics.
At the same time, the preferential treatment of some economies is already leading to
defensive reactions by others. Once Singapore and Thailand negotiate PTAs, other countries
may decide that they cannot be left on the sidelines as their neighbours negotiate deals which
can lead to discrimination against them. However, new discriminatory deals which are driven
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by defensive reactions against other agreements will not coalesce smoothly into wider zones of
free trade.8
Although most new agreements declare themselves to be open to accession, the region
needs to confront the reality that preferential deals, especially those which dodge the most
difficult pockets of protectionism, create new vested interests against wider cooperation.
If the network of new and proposed discriminatory trading arrangements are to evolve into
a wider agreement covering the very diverse East Asian group of economies, these economies will
need to devise a strategy for bringing them together. That will need more than lip-service to WTO
disciplines on PTAs, which have nothing to say about accession: it will also require the design
and adoption of WTO-plus principles for new CEPs.9
Trade strategy options for East Asia
While economic cooperation implies more than the reduction of policy impediments to trade and
investment, this section concentrates on liberalising and facilitating international economic
transactions. The aim is to identify an effective combination of policy instruments for them. It
will be seen that PTAs are only one of several options available to promote economic integration.
Moreover, PTAs will not serve as stepping stones for region-wide integration unless they are
designed to meet standards which are substantially higher than what is needed to meet
minimum WTO obligations.
This section sets out a general framework for assigning bilateral, regional and multi-
lateral policy instruments for pursuing various aspects of trade and investment liberalisation
and facilitation. The following section describes how this applies to East Asia and how the choice
of trade policy instruments for economic integration will influence the capacity for East Asian
economies to work together in other ways to enhance each others’ capacity for sustainable growth.
Objectives and instruments
Promoting economic integration requires the reduction, or elimination, of impediments which
add to the costs and risks of international commerce among any group of economies, such as East
Asia. These impediments can be grouped into:
• border barriers to trade in products and factors of production;
• divergences in standards or administrative procedures;
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• physical impediments (for example, transport and communications networks); and
• uncertainty (for example, contingent protection, such as anti-dumping measures).
Dealing with the first set of impediments is usually termed liberalisation, while arrange-
ments to deal with the second and third sets are termed facilitation. The final group applies to
both liberalisation and facilitation, since uncertainties can prevent specialisation in line with
international comparative advantage, even in the absence of other impediments.
The sets of policy options which can address these issues can be classified as follows:
• unilateral policy reforms by individual governments;
• voluntary cooperation among groups of economies;
• formal agreements or treaties among groups of economies, which may involve PTAs; and
• multilateral agreements on disciplines to limit policies which create impediments to
international commerce, for example, through the WTO.
Groups of economies which are involved in either voluntary or formal economic cooperation
can range from bilateral partnerships among pairs of economies to cooperation in large groups,
such as the East Asian or APEC groups of economies.
The challenge is to match available policy options to objectives, taking care to define each
option for promoting economic cooperation, then assigning these instruments according to their
expected effectiveness in dealing with different impediments to international economic integration.
Border barriers
Border barriers, such as tariffs, bans or quotas, can be classified into barriers to trade in products
(goods or services) and barriers to the international movement of factors of production (capital
or people). Many barriers to the international movement of goods, services, capital and people
have been reduced substantially, or even eliminated, by most economies. This is certainly the
case in East Asia, where governments are aware that ‘opening to the outside world’ is the only
viable strategy for sustainable development.
The great majority of goods, especially goods that have been recently invented, are now
subject to only very light, or no, border barriers. Technology is rapidly making controls on capital
movements obsolete and there are fewer and fewer restrictions on the short-term movement of
people across borders to provide or receive services.
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At the same time, there are some products and factors of production which remain heavily
protected; this is sometimes for cultural reasons, but more often in response to vested interests
of producers who feel threatened by international competition. For example, most governments
protect farmers producing staple foods, economies with relatively high labour costs usually
protect their textile and clothing sectors and many economies restrict investment in mass
media. Very few, if any, economies allow long-term migration of unskilled labour.
For now let us focus on trade in goods and services.
Border barriers to trade in products
Many governments, including in East Asia, have demonstrated that they are willing to act
individually to reduce many border barriers. They have also proved willing to implement such
reforms as part of the program of concerted unilateral liberalisation which has been adopted
by APEC. Individual action plans (IAPs) of APEC economies indicate that voluntary liberali-
sation is making reasonably consistent progress. However, it is becoming increasingly evident
that voluntary cooperation will not be able to deal with the most sensitive sectors.
For these sectors, the political cost of reform outweighs the potential economy-wide gains,
so concerted liberalisation of sensitive sectors is not perceived as a positive-sum game. In these
cases, where reform is perceived as a ‘concession’ to others, negotiations are needed to reduce
border barriers.
Progress on such hard issues is most likely to be made in forums, like the WTO, which are
designed to create the possibility of negotiating simultaneous action by the many economies
involved. Indeed, the WTO has been able to reduce border barriers, even in difficult sectors like
agriculture and clothing. Some more progress can be expected, in due course, from the Doha
Round, especially if East Asian economies are willing to offer significant liberalisation of their
sensitive sectors in return for reforms by others.
Lowering border barriers can also be negotiated as part of PTAs between pairs or among
small groups of economies. However, for reasons set out in Findlay et al (2003), it is harder to
deal with sensitive sectors in small groups. Compared to multilateral negotiations, it is more
difficult to overcome vested interests against reform. In a growing number of examples, PTAs
deal with relatively easy issues, while dodging around the hardest ones. In these circumstances,
they are not really adding much to liberalisation, compared with what could have been achieved
elsewhere, with lower costs in terms of trade diversion.
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These considerations suggest that different policy instruments can be assigned to deal
with negligible protection, as against the entrenched protection of a shrinking number of ‘sunset
industries’ and other sensitive matters.
Zero or negligible border barriers
Barriers to trade in many goods and services are low for several reasons. For example, vested
interests against international competition may have already been overcome, possibly in the
course of past multilateral trade negotiations, or, in the case of new products or factors of
production, because vested interests against international competition may not yet have
become effective.
International negotiations are no longer, or not yet, needed to remove such negligible
border barriers. Unilateral reforms are possible and desirable, since the benefits of reform
accrue largely to the economies undertaking the reform. At the same time, concerted unilateral
liberalisation, through voluntary international economic cooperation (for example, through
APEC), can help accelerate the process, since the benefits can be magnified if trading partners
are undertaking similar reforms.
There is some resistance to voluntary reform by those who believe that such reforms can
prove more useful in the context of bilateral or multilateral negotiations. However, negligible
reductions of already low barriers do not provide negotiating leverage on other, more difficult,
issues. Therefore, there is no need to wait for formal rounds of negotiations – the WTO provides
means for obtaining credit from past reforms.
In many cases, the prevailing low border barriers are far below the ceilings notified to (or
‘bound’ in) the WTO. East Asian economies which have implemented significant trade policy
reforms in recent years can use the WTO not just for further reductions, but to undertake to bind
border barriers at their already low rates. Such WTO ‘bindings’ can generate negotiating leverage
from past reforms, since they reduce the uncertainty faced by trading partners.
High border barriers
The Doha Round can also be used to help reduce remaining high border barriers. East Asian
economies could choose to take a passive role, reducing barriers only to the extent which is needed
to avoid a failure of the round. On the other hand, they could take a collective leadership role,
by offering to make large reductions if others were willing to match them.
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If East Asian governments remained committed to the APEC objective of free and open
trade and investment, as agreed in Bogor in 1994, they could offer to dismantle all border barriers
in sectors covered by WTO disciplines by 2010 or 2020, as long as other economies were also
willing to do so.
If other economies, including the United States and the EU, were willing to respond by
dismantling all their remaining border barriers, then bilateral and sub-regional PTAs would
no longer be needed to reduce barriers covered by WTO disciplines. CEPs could deal with other
matters.
Unfortunately, as shown by the failure of the Cancun meeting of WTO ministers in
September 2003, not all significant economies are ready to negotiate on dismantling politically
sensitive border barriers in the WTO. In this case, PTAs could make a difference, but only if they
were able to deal with issues which cannot be solved in the WTO: this is the ‘competitive
liberalisation’ argument for PTAs.
Let us consider the options for dealing with politically sensitive, high border barriers in
PTAs. Under what circumstances could such agreements lead to a WTO-consistent reduction
of border barriers throughout East Asia? It may be useful to look at some examples.
Singapore has been reaping the benefits of free trade in goods for some time. Recently,
Singapore has signed a sequence of PTAs, with New Zealand, Japan, Australia and the United
States, which reduce most remaining barriers to trade in services, for example in financial
services. Each of these agreements will force Singapore’s service providers to become more
competitive. Once these agreements have been in place for some time, Singapore is likely to be
ready to remove any remaining border barriers to trade in these services with all other economies,
including East Asian economies. Such PTAs, where benefits granted initially to some economies
are progressively extended to other economies, can be regarded as stepping stones to wider
liberalisation.
Other examples may not be as constructive. As noted above, if an economy is not yet ready
to open some sectors to significant international competition, it can enter into PTAs only with
economies which do not offer serious competition in these sectors or with economies which are
willing to exclude these sectors from the agreement. Since the WTO does allow some exemptions,
it would be possible to envisage a WTO-consistent agreement between economies which wish
to protect the same set of products. For example, Japan and Korea could create a PTA which
excluded rice.
10
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However, such an agreement could not be expanded to an East Asia-wide agreement unless
those economies which were efficient rice producers were also willing to exclude that product.
In that case, they would seek to exclude some other products in which they were not prepared
to face competition from Korea and Japan. In a very diverse region like East Asia, economies have
different sets of ‘sensitive sectors’. If they all wanted to exclude their ‘sensitive sectors’, then
PTAs among pairs or small groups of East Asian economies could not be linked to form a WTO-
consistent PTA to cover all of East Asia.
This dilemma is illustrated in Table 1(a). As shown, PTAs are not needed to deal with ‘easy’
sectors, where border barriers are already eliminated or set at negligibly low levels. At the same
time, the PTAs which are currently agreed, or expected to be agreed, tend to exempt the most
‘sensitive sectors’. In that case, they cannot be expected to link up to cover all of East Asia.
The problem could be avoided if PTAs anticipated future policy changes which would
expose sensitive products to progressively greater competition. This could be achieved by
agreeing that products which were initially excluded from the coverage of agreements would be
included subsequently, so that PTAs would become comprehensive over time, and by agreeing
that lowered border barriers initially offered to PTA partners would be offered to other economies
over time. In each case, the transition period could be, say, 10 years.10
PTAs which accepted either of these principles would be genuine stepping stones towards
global free trade and investment. But only PTAs which accepted both of these principles would
make it possible to achieve free and open trade and investment in East Asia, APEC-wide or more
broadly. It would be important to write such principles into PTAs at the outset, since any
preferential deal generates subsequent vested interests against extending similar preferences
to others.
Such principles would set considerably higher standards than current WTO disciplines.
The difficulties experienced in seeking to tighten WTO disciplines on PTAs suggest that such
principles are not likely to be accepted by all members of the WTO. Could such WTO-plus
standards for PTAs be accepted by APEC economies?
The NAFTA, and more recently the PTA between the United States and Singapore,
contain detailed rules of origin designed to prevent competition in sensitive sectors against other
economies, including other APEC economies. They, or others, may not be willing to consider
APEC-wide competition in their sensitive sectors.11  For similar reasons, such WTO-plus
principles for PTAs may not acceptable to East Asian economies. In that case, there would be
no real prospect of East Asia-wide free and open trade and investment as part of a drive towards
economic integration in the region.
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(b) WTO-plus economic partnerships
Border barriers
Zero or Feasible Feasible, Feasible, Feasible, Feasible, Feasible,
negligible with magnified through but do not but do not though
protection mutual benefit concerted uni- need CEPs for need CEPs not essential.
from concerted lateral this purpose for this Can obtain
reforms liberalisation purpose credit for past
voluntary
liberalisation
Highly Not Very difficult Has proven to Feasible, WTO-plus Feasible, but
protected possible be too hard and include all CEPs can be difficult
sensitive products merged later
sectors following a to form an
transition East Asia-wide
period agreement
Principles for Agree to adopt WTO-plus CEPs
design of WTO-plus involving East
PTAs principles Asian economies
Table 1 Removing border barriers to trade in East Asia
Policy options Voluntary cooperation Formal agreements
Issues Unilateral East Asia APEC Closer East Asia WTO
economic (Doha
partnerships Round)
(a) Merely WTO-consistent economic partnerships
Border barriers
Zero or Feasible Feasible, Feasible, Feasible, Feasible, Feasible,
negligible with magnified through but do not but do not though not
protection mutual benefit concerted need CEPs need CEPs essential.
from concerted unilateral for this for this Can obtain
reforms liberalisation purpose purpose credit for past
voluntary
liberalisation
Highly Not Very difficult Has proven Feasible, but CEPs which Feasible, but
protected possible to be too hard usually dodge dodge hard difficult
sensitive sensitive issues cannot
sectors issues be merged
to form an
East Asia-wide
agreement
Principles No better than
for design merely WTO-
of PTAs consistent
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Fortunately, there is some hope that WTO-plus principles for PTAs may be accepted by
East Asian economies. Firstly, they may give adequate priority to East Asia-wide economic
cooperation, rather than creating a large number of small PTAs which prove impossible to link.
Secondly, East Asian economies may also be serious about using PTAs with a gradually wider
set of economies as preparation for global competitiveness.
There are some positive precedents. When implementing the preferential tariff arrange-
ments of AFTA, ASEAN economies have often lowered their general non-discriminatory (most
favoured nation) tariffs. They may be willing to make a general commitment to do so, possibly
after some well-defined transition period. Others may be willing to follow such an example. If
so, the dilemma illustrated in Table 1(a) could be resolved for trade in goods and services.
Table 1(b) illustrates a better outcome, which could be achieved if East Asian economies
agreed that any PTAs involving their economies would adopt the WTO-plus principles discussed
above. In that case, sensitive products would be included in these agreements after an agreed
transition period. Moreover, any benefits granted to some economies would be extended
subsequently, at least to other East Asian economies.
With such WTO-plus principles, sensitive issues would be dodged only for a limited time.
PTAs involving East Asian economies could be linked, after that time, to form an East Asia-wide
PTA. In that case, PTAs would make a genuine contribution to economic integration in East Asia.
Such PTAs would also act as a stepping stone towards APEC-wide free and open trade
and investment. If East Asian economies succeeded in forming a WTO-plus PTA, then it would
be up to the rest of APEC to decide whether to revise their trade policies, including the design
of the PTAs in which they are involved, in order to widen free and open trade and investment from
East Asia to APEC.
Factors of production
The Osaka Action Agenda confirmed that free and open trade and investment means the
dismantling of border barriers to all products. It is less certain whether it is also intended to
dismantle all restrictions to cross-border movement of all factors of production, which are not
covered by WTO disciplines in the same way as goods or services.
It is reasonable to expect that, for the foreseeable future, very few East Asian economies
will be willing to remove all such barriers, especially restrictions on long-term movement of
unskilled labour. In that case, the concept of ‘comprehensiveness’ in the above principles could
be restricted to those border barriers which are covered by WTO disciplines.
13
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On the other hand, East Asian economies may want to set a WTO-plus standard for
comprehensiveness to include a wide range of factor movements, possibly with limited excep-
tions.
Beyond border barriers
The Osaka Action Agenda makes it clear that free and open trade and investment requires far
more than the dismantling of border barriers. As demonstrated by the evolution of the EU, a
wide-ranging set of cooperative arrangements on matters such as the mutual recognition of
standards and the harmonisation of economic regulations is also needed to create a unified
market.
The EU did not address these non-border issues seriously until well after the removal of
border barriers among members. But it is not necessary to proceed in that order. APEC
economies are implementing an extensive agenda to facilitate trade and investment at the same
time as they tackle border barriers. The world’s largest economies, the EU and the United States,
have decided to leave negotiations on remaining border barriers to the WTO while embarking
on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). This is a framework for implementing a
growing number of cooperative arrangements to facilitate trade in goods, services and some
factors of production between the two economies.12
East Asian economies can choose to proceed with the liberalisation of border barriers
alongside a program of facilitation to address non-border barriers to trade and investment.
Moreover, it would be possible to implement East Asia-wide cooperative arrangements to reduce
some costs and risks of international commerce in the region, even if it proves difficult to
implement East Asia-wide liberalisation of some border barriers.
As for liberalisation, several trade policy instruments can be used for facilitation, ranging
from unilateral action to WTO-wide agreements. This is illustrated below using the example
of ‘smart-card’ passports.
One practical example of facilitating trade in services would be to speed up transit through
immigration checkpoints. Many economies already have machine-readable passports for this
purpose.
As a (hypothetical, but feasible) further step, one or more economies could introduce
‘smart-card’ versions of passports, resembling the entry cards already used by several organi-
sations. These cards would be designed to be read electronically, while displaying information
14
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which can confirm the identity of the holder and checking that the person is eligible to enter or
to leave.13
One economy could act unilaterally to introduce such a card in order to speed up the
processing of its own citizens on arrival and departure. That would lead to some cost savings.
However, the benefits of such innovation would be magnified by a cooperative arrangement
among several economies to introduce compatible smart-card versions of their passports. If such
an arrangement was implemented by some economies, then others might wish to join, by
adopting similar technology. As in the case of the APEC Business Travel Card, a smart-card
passport arrangement could be pioneered by a group of APEC economies, with a view to gradually
extending the arrangement to the rest of APEC.
East Asian economies could promote closer regional integration by adopting such practical
arrangements to facilitate trade or investment among themselves. They may be able to progress
more rapidly than the wider APEC group.
A practical arrangement for facilitation, such as mutually compatible smart-card pass-
ports, could also be adopted as part of a CEP agreement between two East Asian economies.
Could that arrangement be widened to include other East Asian economies, or perhaps all APEC
economies?
It would be desirable to include others, since the benefits of the arrangement become
greater as more participants join the network of economies with more easily processed migration
documents. However, if the arrangement was part of a wider CEP, then, as discussed below, the
design of that formal partnership would determine whether others could join.
Facilitating trade and investment in APEC
The above, hypothetical, example is just one of many options for facilitating trade and
investment. Each of these options can be dealt with individually, on its own merits. Alterna-
tively, groups of economies may want to deal simultaneously with several options for facilitation.
APEC has been designed so that options for facilitation can be considered one at a time.
For example, APEC economies are adopting a sequence of arrangements, each of which is leading
to cost savings by progressive harmonisation of customs procedures. APEC economies can also
choose to deal with several related arrangements simultaneously, for example mutual recog-
nition of standards for a number of related products.
In addition, in their 2001 Shanghai Accord, APEC leaders endorsed the concept of
‘pathfinder initiatives’, reaffirming a principle (first stated in the Bogor Declaration) that APEC
15
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economies that are ready to implement a cooperative arrangement may go ahead, while those
that are not yet ready to participate may join such an arrangement at a later date.
This flexibility offers two important advantages. It recognises that implementing coop-
erative arrangements for facilitation often requires extensive capacity building. For example,
few economies oppose the concept of harmonising customs procedures, but not all of them are
able to install and operate the systems which are needed to do so. The concept of pathfinder
initiatives allows some APEC economies to implement practical arrangements to reduce the
cost or risks of some economic transactions, setting examples for others and then encouraging
and/or helping them to develop the capacity to join later.
The ability to deal with some issues ahead of others also makes it possible to deal with
easier matters first. That can generate perceptible mutual benefits, generating the confidence
needed to tackle more complex or sensitive matters later. Such flexibility has served to generate
momentum in, and measurable benefits from, APEC’s ongoing facilitation program.
Facilitating trade and investment in closer economic partnerships
The CEPs which have been agreed recently, as well as those under consideration among East
Asian economies, deal with many issues at the same time. In most cases, they contain a PTA
for liberalising border barriers, together with a set of cooperative arrangements for reducing
various costs or risks of trade and investment among the partners.
With many CEPs in prospect in East Asia, it is quite likely that several will pioneer
innovative arrangements to deal with new aspects of facilitation. In principle, it would be
desirable to use these new arrangements as precedents for region-wide facilitation.
For example, as illustrated in Figure 1, an agreement between two East Asian economies
(A and B) may contain a PTA together with numerous arrangements for facilitation. Other East
Asian economies (C and D) may wish to join one of these arrangements and demonstrate that
they can implement the policies and make the investments necessary to join that particular
initiative.
If CEPs are seen as precedents for wider cooperation, then they should be allowed to join
those particular arrangements. However, problems might arise if they are not permitted to join
any aspect of a CEP unless they participate in every part of a wide-ranging agreement.
For example, Economy C may want to join a specific mutual recognition agreement (say
for safety standards for toys) adopted by A and B. However, it may be blocked from joining that
arrangement unless it also joins a PTA between A and B. But that may be impossible in practice.
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New issues
PTA
Harmonisating
regulations
Standards
Competition
policy
etc.
Preferential
agreement
on border
barriers
Figure 1 The effects of different facilitation arrangements
Economy A B
Business
travel
C D
??
??
Economy C may have a strong comparative advantage in products which A and B wish to protect
and had excluded from their PTA. In that case, A and B are unlikely to admit C to their PTA,
preventing C from joining any of the facilitation arrangements linked to that PTA.
This problem could be avoided if liberalisation and facilitation were pursued on parallel
tracks. It may prove difficult to link bilateral or sub-regional PTAs into an East Asia-wide
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trading arrangement, but it may be possible to use particular cooperative arrangements for
facilitation – arrangements which were pioneered in CEPs – to promote region-wide facilitation.
Another kind of problem could be caused by limited capacity to implement a large number
of arrangements for facilitation simultaneously. The EU has adopted such an all-or-nothing
approach. There is an ‘acquis communitaire’ of several hundred arrangements, which potential
participants are required to adopt at the same time. This has made the EU very difficult to join.
Such an acquis communitaire approach would be highly undesirable for the Asia Pacific,
which is seeking to promote the integration of a very diverse group of economies. Economies like
Japan and Singapore have the capacity to implement many cooperative arrangements to
facilitate trade and investment. However, others, like Brunei or Vietnam, may find it impossible
to join all the facilitation arrangements which have been agreed by Japan and Singapore.
Closer economic partnerships as pathfinders for region-wide facilitation
Asia Pacific economies should seek to encourage others to accede to any practical arrangements
to facilitate trade or investment which might be pioneered within a new CEP. That could be
ensured by a careful specification of the conditions for accession. At present, most new
partnerships contain a general clause that states that third parties who accept the provisions
of the existing agreement can accede to it, subject to the consent of existing partners.
Such an accession clause could be interpreted to mean that a potential new participant
would need to enter all the arrangements of the existing CEP simultaneously. In that case, if
some economy wanted to join a particular cooperative arrangement for facilitation (for example,
mutual recognition of a specific product standard), it may be required to join a PTA among
existing partners as well as a large number of other arrangements for facilitation.
As discussed above, it can often be impossible for new economies to join a PTA which was
tailor-made to suit the sensitivities of existing partners. Moreover, some economies do not have
the capacity to accede to many arrangements for facilitation at the same time. For these reasons,
a general accession clause may make it very difficult to use facilitation arrangements which were
pioneered in a CEP as catalysts for East Asia or APEC-wide facilitation.
This potential problem is illustrated in Table 2(a). If new participants are required to
implement every part of a CEP at the same time, it will also be hard to use bilateral or sub-
regional CEPs as stepping stones for region-wide facilitation.
To promote region-wide facilitation, it would be desirable for all arrangements to
facilitate trade and investment, including arrangements agreed as part of CEPs, to be potential
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Table 2 Partnerships to facilitate trade and investment in East Asia
Policy options Voluntary cooperation Formal agreements
Issues Unilateral East Asia APEC Closer East Asia WTO
economic (Doha
partnerships Round)
(a) Simultaneous accession to all arrangements for facilitation
Options for facilitation
Potential co- Limited Potential for Considerable Usually Hard to Too many
operative progress East Asia wide progress include ar- implement members
arrangements possible arrangements being made rangements any East for simul-
include mutual for Asia wide taneous
recognition facilitation liberalisation progress
agreements
and harmonising Could move Pathfinder Often
administrative ahead of APEC initiatives can alongside
procedures set examples PTAs
Can deal Can deal Can deal Usually deal And very
with issues with issues with issues with many hard to forge
one at a one at a time one at a issues at the links to
time time same time existing CEPs
Principles for Accession
facilitation possible only to
CEP as a whole
(b) Able to join individual arrangements for facilitation
Options for facilitation
Potential co- Limited Potential for Considerable Usually in- Hard to Too many
operative progress East Asia wide progress clude arrange- implement members
arrangements possible arrangements being made ments for any East for simul-
include mutual facilitation Asia wide taneous
recognition liberalisation progress
agreements Could move Pathfinder Often along-
and harmonising ahead of APEC initiatives side PTAs
administrative can set examples
procedures
Can deal Can deal Can deal Usually deal But easy to
with issues with issues with issues with many promote
one at a one at a time one at a issues at the region-wide
time time same time facilitation
Principles for Agree on new Could also Individual
facilitation principle for agree on new arrangements
facilitation principle for for facilitation
accession open to accession
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catalysts for wider arrangements. That could be achieved by agreeing that all arrangements for
facilitation should be open to accession by economies which are willing and able to conform to
the requirements of that particular arrangement. Table 2(b) illustrates such an arrangement.
APEC economies have already adopted a set of principles for facilitation which encourage
transparent and non-discriminatory arrangements. Adding a principle on accession would form
a logical link between APEC’s already agreed principles for facilitation and the concept of
pathfinder initiatives  within APEC, as endorsed in the Shanghai Accord of 2001. Therefore, such
a principle should be acceptable to East Asian governments and, hopefully, to all APEC
governments.14
New arrangements to facilitate trade or investment which were created as part of a CEP
involving East Asian economies (or preferably all APEC economies) would then be potential
pioneers for APEC-wide arrangements. Other East Asian or APEC economies could decide
whether to join arrangements pioneered in the context of CEPs.
Policy choices for East Asia
Closer economic partnerships to promote a growing sense of community in East Asia are
likely to include:
• sharing information, experience, expertise and technology in order to enhance human,
technological and institutional capacity in the region;
• encouraging investment in infrastructure and technology to form region-wide networks,
for example in transport, communications and energy supply;
• trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation to reduce policy obstacles to
mutually beneficial economic integration.
These aims are similar to those of APEC for the wider Asia Pacific region. APEC is finding
it difficult to implement such cooperation, partly because of the great diversity of its wide
membership and partly because of excessive preoccupation with trade policy.
East Asia may be able to make more progress in a smaller, albeit still diverse, group.
Countries could commence cooperation by sharing information, experience, expertise and
technology, promoting closer physical linkages among their economies and practical arrange-
ments to facilitate international commerce. The benefits of such cooperation could build the
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sense of mutual trust, respect and benefit which can create the foundation for tackling the
sometimes sensitive issues involved in removing border barriers to trade and investment.
All these opportunities for cooperation are under consideration, but East Asian leaders
are placing most emphasis on trade policy, apparently convinced that all serious economic
cooperation needs to start with a PTA. As has happened in APEC, over-concentration on trade
matters could make it difficult to foster region-wide cooperation to achieve broader regional
development objectives in East Asia. It may be useful to look at alternative or complementary
means to advance cooperation.
Next steps on trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation
Several policy instruments, ranging from unilateral to multilateral, are available to promote
closer economic integration in East Asia alongside progress in APEC and the WTO. Bilateral
or sub-regional CEPs can play a constructive part in this effort. But that will only happen if these
CEPs are based on principles which make it possible to link them in order to form wider
partnerships.
As discussed, it is not sufficient to implement CEPs based on discriminatory PTAs with
selective product coverage and a general clause on accession. If East Asian economies really
intend to link these CEPs in future, then the PTAs within these arrangements will need to meet
higher standards. Such WTO-plus principles would set firm timetables to extend product
coverage so that the PTAs become comprehensive; and to extend the benefits of preferential trade
liberalisation to other economies over time. East Asian governments should also agree that all
arrangements to facilitate trade and investment among them should be open to accession, so
that they can be ‘pathfinder initiatives’ in the context of APEC.
WTO-plus PTAs
If East Asian economies agreed to adopt such WTO-principles, then sensitive sectors could be
avoided at the outset, but exposed to wider competition within a well-defined period. It would
be possible to link these PTAs at the end of such a transition period. It would also be possible
to merge the cooperative arrangements for facilitating trade and investment which were linked
to these PTAs.
If PTAs involving East Asian economies were to become comprehensive after some time,
with benefits extended to other economies over time, then East Asian economies would be able
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to meet their Bogor commitment to free and open trade and investment at the end of these
transition periods. Moreover, East Asian economies would be in a position to make a substantial
offer in the Doha Development Round. They could offer to bind those levels of protection which
were already at low rates; and to dismantle border barriers to sensitive sectors by the end of the
transition periods specified in their PTAs. That would be a very substantial offer which could
alter the dynamics of the WTO negotiations. In return, East Asia could demand very significant
liberalisation from others.15
To sum up, if such principles were endorsed for PTAs involving East Asian economies,
countries could embark on them with some confidence that in the foreseeable future they could
be linked up as an important component of a possible East Asian economic community and make
a contribution to both APEC-wide and multilateral trade and investment liberalisation and
facilitation.
However, East Asian leaders may prove unwilling to consider such WTO-plus principles,
in order to avoid any commitment to expose their sensitive sectors to international competition
in future.
Business as usual?
Negotiating PTAs has become very fashionable in recent years. Part of their attraction may be
that it is all too easy to meet the weak and ambiguous conditions for complying with existing
WTO disciplines on discriminatory trading arrangements. Under current rules, economies can
select favoured trading partners and build closer links with them, without any commitment to
expose their sensitive sectors to real competition. If avoiding sensitive sectors is a significant
part of the motive for PTAs in East Asia, then the region’s governments will not agree to adopt
the higher, WTO-plus, standards recommended above.
In that case, PTAs which avoid sensitive issues can be expected to proliferate. Lip-service
will continue to be given to WTO consistency, while countries take advantage of the loopholes
available to exclude sensitive sectors and/or to exclude trading partners which might offer
effective competition in these sectors.
The recent Japan–Singapore agreement is a warning. Although Singapore has negligible
agriculture, Japan insisted on excluding those few segments of agriculture in which Singapore
is a potential exporter to Japan. An efficient rice producer like Thailand could never expect to
join such an agreement. Any PTA involving both Thailand and Japan would only be feasible if
Thailand agreed to exclude most agricultural products.
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Such agreements would not be stepping stones towards region-wide, let alone APEC-wide,
free and open trade and investment. On the contrary, they would indicate that the economies
involved do not intend to include others which might compete with their sensitive sectors.
Moreover, as more such selective PTAs are signed, more and more economies are likely
to resist consideration of the WTO-plus standards for PTAs, which will be needed for PTAs to
contribute to region-wide economic integration. That is why it is urgent to press for such
principles to be adopted as soon as possible.
Agreements with economies outside the region may also cut across the objective of East
Asian economic integration. Unless care is taken, agreements with North American or Latin
American economies could rule out subsequent moves to extend the benefits of trade liberali-
sation to other East Asian economies.
If East Asian economies refuse to accept WTO-plus principles for their PTAs, then it will
not be possible to link such PTAs to create an East Asia-wide zone of free and open trade and
investment. That would make it hard to envisage an East Asia-wide trading arrangement.
However, region-wide facilitation of trade and investment may be possible, even if region-wide
liberalisation proves too hard.
Region-wide facilitation of trade and investment
Region-wide facilitation could begin to generate East Asia-wide benefits, providing the motive,
as well as the mutual confidence, needed to face up to the politically difficult decisions on
sensitive sectors that will be needed some time in the future. Progress could be made on at least
two fronts.
One would be to accelerate the ongoing work towards APEC-wide facilitation to implement
the wide-ranging Osaka Action Agenda for facilitating trade and investment. APEC’s work on
facilitation is already leading to appreciable region-wide gains. East Asian economies are
participating in this collective effort and reaping some of the benefits. They could also choose
to move faster than the APEC group as a whole, with East Asian economies implementing ideas
which could become pathfinder initiatives in the APEC process.
Secondly, the cooperative arrangements to facilitate trade and investment which are
being developed as part of CEPs involving East Asian economies could also act as catalysts for
wider facilitation arrangements among East Asian and other Asia Pacific economies.
CEPs could play such a positive, catalytic role if the arrangements for facilitation are
readily accessible to other trading partners. As discussed above, this will need more than a very
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general clause about accession to CEPs as a whole. It would be desirable to adopt a principle
that arrangements to facilitate trade and investment which are adopted as part of CEPs should
also serve as pathfinder initiatives for region-wide arrangements.16
If East Asian leaders endorsed such a principle, they could promote region-wide facilita-
tion backed by region-wide capacity-building which is needed to implement innovative coopera-
tive arrangements to reduce the costs and risks of trade and investment.
Conclusion
Economic cooperation anywhere, including in East Asia, involves more than trade liberalisation.
There are many other opportunities for cooperation, including the mutually beneficial exchange
of information, experience, expertise and technology needed for sustainable development;
improvements in transport, communications and energy links; and the facilitation of trade and
investment by mutual recognition or harmonisation of economic regulations.
After several decades of ‘opening to the outside world’, many formal border barriers to
trade have already been reduced to negligible levels. At the same time, political pressures
continue to sustain high protection of a few sensitive sectors, especially in agriculture. East
Asian governments do not seem prepared to remove obstacles to trade in some sensitive sectors
in the WTO, so they are much less likely to do so, for less reward, in bilateral or sub-regional
trading arrangements.
In such circumstances, there is little need for formal agreements to liberalise border
barriers to trade in most products, and negotiations on trade in sensitive sectors are likely to
prove either impossible or divisive. It would seem more efficient to leave attempts to deal with
sensitive sectors to the WTO, while pursuing other opportunities for cooperation among East
Asian economies. However, in practice, East Asian governments are preferring to follow the
conventional wisdom that serious economic cooperation must start with a PTA.
If East Asia’s PTAs do no more than meet the minimum requirements of the WTO, they
will only deal somewhat symbolically with the easy sectors. And, if they avoid the hard issues,
it will not prove possible to link these PTAs to form an East Asia-wide trading arrangement.
Alternatively, East Asian leaders could adopt WTO-plus principles for their PTAs, along
the lines recommended in this paper, which would require them to become comprehensive in
terms of product coverage and to extend liberalisation to other economies in the medium term.
Such WTO-plus PTAs could be linked subsequently and could form part of broader efforts
towards economic cooperation and integration.
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The agreements that have been forged so far show a tendency to be no more than WTO-
consistent, avoiding the sectors where hard political decisions might be required. Here lies a
dilemma. If East Asian leaders cannot accept the political difficulty of liberalising their
sensitive sectors, even in the medium term, then the current addiction to negotiating PTAs will
not contribute to the stated goal of a region-wide economic community. Instead, it may make it
harder to pursue other mutually beneficial opportunities for cooperation and strengthening a
sense of community.
The time has come to explore 21st century approaches to economic cooperation, looking
beyond free trade areas.
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Notes
1 In this paper, East Asia is defined as the members of ASEAN plus China, Hong Kong,
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.
2 Clause 1 of the Seoul APEC Declaration (1991) sets out a similar set of objectives for
APEC.
3 See Elek and Soesastro (2000) for a discussion of the links and balance between APEC’s
trade policy and economic and technical cooperation activities.
4 Closer economic partnerships (CEPs) usually consist of a preferential arrangement to
liberalise border barriers to trade, complemented by a number of arrangements to
address new issues in order to facilitate trade and investment among the participants
of the CEP. The term ‘regional trading arrangement’ (RTA) is often used as an
alternative to CEP. However, this paper uses the CEP description, in order to emphasise
that these partnerships are more than trading arrangements. Similarly, the term
preferential trading arrangement (PTA) is used in preference to free trade area (FTA),
since these are preferential, or discriminatory, trading arrangements which seldom
lead to fully free trade among participants.
5 These issues are discussed in full in a review of regional trading arrangements by the
Trade Forum of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). See <http://pecc.org>.
6 See Bridges Weekly Trade News, 16 April, 2003 at <bridges_weekly@istsd.ch>.
7 These issues have been raised in a series of seminars on East Asian trade policy options
convened by the Australian National University and the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta. Reports of these seminars are available from the
Australia–Japan Research Centre, Australian National University.
8 ASEAN economies are being courted for new partnerships from all sides – from China,
Japan, the United States, Australia/New Zealand, India and even the EU. At first sight,
this would appear to give ASEAN the opportunity to be a hub amidst many important
economies. However, actual agreements are likely to be signed by individual members,
rather than ASEAN as a whole. Individual ASEAN economies could thus become spokes
to several other hubs. The potential problem of splitting rather than linking existing
partnerships is demonstrated by a new side-effect of the recently signed PTA between
Singapore and the United States. Trade between Malaysia and Singapore, as well as
trade between Batam Island and the rest of Indonesia, is now subject to rules of origin
imposed by this new discriminatory agreement.
9 The Trade Forum of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council has drawn up a set of
guidelines for the design of CEPs which could lead to the achievement of APEC’s Bogor
goals for free and open trade and investment. They are available at <http://pecc.org>.
It is hoped that these guidelines will lead to a common understanding on the design of
economic partnerships involving Asia Pacific economies. However, adherence to such
guidelines would require significant adjustments to the design of already existing
partnerships.
10 Such enhancements to PTAs are also proposed in the PECC guidelines mentioned in
the preceding footnote.
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11 If some APEC economies are not willing to face such competition, even after a reasonable
transition period, then they will not meet their commitment to free and open trade and
investment in the foreseeable future. A refusal to accept such principles for PTAs would
amount to an admission that the Bogor targets are not expected to be met.
12 See Elek (1998).
13 Such information could include digital photographs as well as other biometric data.
14 Such an additional principle for facilitating trade and investment could be stated as
follows:
‘Co-operative arrangements to facilitate trade and investment may be pioneered
among pairs or groups of economies, including in the context of closer economic
partnerships (or regional trading arrangements) involving APEC economies.
In line with the principles of the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda and the concept of pathfinder
initiatives endorsed in the 2001 Shanghai Accord, APEC economies should be encour-
aged to pioneer new arrangements for facilitation.
In the interest of promoting wider free and open trade and investment, any economy
whose government adopts policies compatible with any existing or proposed co-
operative arrangement involving APEC economies should be able to, and be encouraged
to, become party to any of those arrangements.’
15 East Asian economies would also be justified to demand agreement on tighter WTO
rules for anti-dumping and other forms of contingent protection. That would be an
important gain. The recent proliferation of such contingent protectionism means that
an absence of border barriers is no longer sufficient to provide the basis for a confident
international trading environment (see Flowers and Bosworth 2002).
16 See footnote 14 for the wording of a principle which would be consistent with the concept
of pathfinder initiatives, allowing CEPs to act as pioneering catalysts for region-wide
facilitation.
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